SOME REMARKS ON SELF-DEFENSE AND
INTERVENTION: A REACTION TO READING
LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN
WORLD*
Josef Rohlik**
Lack of statistics notwithstanding, it is fairly obvious to any student of international relations that claims of illegal intervention,
aggression and the political expressions of these legal terms like
western imperialism, have reached in the last decade almost epidemic proportions. An observer during general debate on the forum
of. the United Nations General Assembly must perpetually wonder
what the world would be like if the accusations by governmental
representatives reflected the true behavior of nations and, also, to
what extent the venomous rhetoric contributes to the emergence of
situations which may be a potential cause of a serious breakdown
in international order, such as it is. There are many reasons for the
indiscriminate accusations of actions by states, which, when true,
represent one of the serious violations of contemporary international
law. Increasing internationalization of economic and political life,
improving communications which facilitate access to ideas as well
as ideology, etc., have at least a dual effect. On one hand the growing awareness of people of the impact of international actions on
domestic affairs makes it tempting for national leaders to blame
external "forces" for any domestic problems, I especially if the political rhetoric is likely to arouse nationalist feelings and divert attention of the population from the actual domestic problems the government in question may face. On the other hand, it is undeniable
that more and more international events or actions of other nations
at least indirectly affect most nations; therefore, those nations capable of influencing the course of events elsewhere find it very hard
not to do so in one way or another, 2 often with the genuine belief
that inaction would seriously prejudice their national interest. To
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use a current example,3 it is probably true that the Soviet domination of Angola could pose a threat to the free flow of Angolan oil to
the United States and, coupled with already existing Soviet military
bases in Somalia, could pose a threat to the tanker traffic around
Africa. United States efforts to counter Soviet and Cuban action
through financial assistance to anti-Soviet factions may seem to
have been natural enough and, in view of past practice, even very
temperate. Alternative approaches to the situation might have
seemed to be too impractical. At the beginning of the crisis, when
the decision whether to act and what action to take was made, the
diplomatic solution might have seemed to be unrealistic. In any
event, diplomatic solution takes time during which the Soviet
Union could have accomplished its goal. Development of adequate
protection of tanker traffic, Soviet military bases notwithstanding,
and development of alternative sources of energy might have been
considered too costly or beyond the current technological capability
of the United States. The crucial question of whether the extension
of Soviet influence to Angola would pose a real threat to the security
of the United States might have been considered too risky to be
answered in the negative. The view that without firm American
response the Soviet Union would stop in Angola and not seek further
territorial expansion was probably, one would think, considered utopian.
The behavior of actors as well as the response of the international
community, be it individual states or groupings of states, to armed
conflicts, acts of aggression, intervention, etc., have been marked,
in my view, by three factors.' First, the ideals of the United Nations,
This manuscript was submitted in February 1976.
Almost any author in this area of international law cites factors which influence behavior
of nations. These factors, quite understandably, overlap. It may be noted that this author
omitted "public opinion." It is his belief that (1) there is no "opinion" of the "world" public
in the real sense of that word; (2) in the overwhelming majority of states there is no informed
public opinion, and at any rate "public opinion" is so manipulated that any restraining effect
cannot be discerned; and (3), to be sure, in Western democracies there is public opinion which
influences actions of the governments in question. But even in those latter countries the
public is largely oblivious to armed interventions which do not directly affect the state in
question. Who, for instance, in the United States heard of Iranian intervention in Oman? See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1976, at 15, col. 1. Of course, interest of the public can be aroused by
television pictures of hungry children with oversized bellies. But the public is never told that
such pictures could have been taken months before or after the intervention and that such
pictures seldom express the state of affairs caused primarily by the action involved. In that
sense, even in the West, public opinion is manipulated by the incomplete information which
the majority of people receive, quite apart from frequent manipulation of public opinion by
the government, individual members of the legislature, etc. This conclusion has an important
bearing on rejection of subjective criteria in connection with the discussion on intervention,
infra.
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especially the prohibition of the use of force under article 2, paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter are certainly viable in the sense that
they reflect the desire of mankind and the goal of the international
community. As such they represent a restricting element (for the
actor as well as for the state or states which consider it necessary to
respond) at least to the extent that no contemporary state has
openly rejected the prohibition of the use of force in violation of the
Charter and that the action undertaken in violation of the Charter
is designed to fit a more or less plausible justification under the
Charter itself, most often that of self-defense or promotion of the
right of self-determination. The second factor is the reality of contemporary international society. It includes the need for changes in
the international order which, it seems, cannot always be accomplished peacefully. It includes different priorities of new, poor nations as opposed to nations of the industrial West, and different
ideologies of the superpowers. It includes Soviet belief in and practice of territorial expansion matched only by Disraeli's conception
of the British empire. The second factor also includes the recognition of what "the scourge of war"' would be like today; i.e., the fear
of consequences of nuclear war and the attendant assumption that
world peace depends on the balance of power. The third factor is
represented by the unwillingness of principal actors6 to compromise,
i.e., to agree on a standard or rules which they at least would intend
to observe without reservation, and by the unwillingness or inability
of other states to insist on a sufficiently specific agreement on interpretation of the "Law of the United Nations." The standard for
intervention and an action in self-defense are the principal topics
of this article.
The United Nations' responses' have varied in form and effectiveness. It is possible to recall various actions of the United Nations
which contributed to solutions (sometimes temporary solutions) of
particular international crises. The Korean war, the India-Pakistan
war of 1965, and situations in which U.N. emergency forces or ob5 U.N. CHARTER preamble.

The term "principal actors" as used here is not synonymous with the term principal
powers. For example, Cuban participation in Angola coupled with the Cuban attitude towards "export of revolution" in the 1960's would justify characterization of Cuba as one of
the states whose assent to any new, comprehensive regulation of, say, subversive activities
would have to be sought.
For an excellent discussion of factors influencing United Nations responses, see Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD
401, 415 et seq. (John Norton Moore ed. 1974) [the work edited by John Norton Moore will
be cited hereinafter as Moorel.
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servers were used are among cases which come to mind. One also
may recall recommendations of the U.N. General Assembly frustrated by the inaction of the Security Council, as in the case of the
India-Pakistan war of 1971.1 The diplomatic mission of Ambassador
Jarring, although not successful, should certainly be considered a
form of response of the United Nations to the Middle Eastern crisis.
Another form of response is represented by the so-called declaratory
resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, the purposes
of which are to interpret the Charter and the rules of contemporary
international law, and some of which are to a certain extent subject
to the discussion which follows.
I.

2(4) OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES

ARTICLE

The prohibition of "the threat or use of force against territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations"
under article 2(4) of the Charter certainly is not free from ambiguity This author's premise is that the term "force" should be interpreted as armed force, or at least as a physical force sufficiently
similar to armed force,"0 as, e.g., in the case of the organized
' G.A. Res. 2793, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 29, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971) (adopted on
December 7, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Resolution 2793]. For a summary of the debate on
the forum of the U.N. Security Council see [1971] Y.B. U.N. 143-61 (1974).
D. BoWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
BOWETT].
,I Id. at 148.
On the other hand there have been scholarly attempts to read article 2(4) of the Charter
as prohibiting the use of any force, including "economic force," "against territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations." See, e.g., Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to
International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 415-20 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Paust &
Blaustein]. It is significant, in my view, that, for example, Messrs. Paust and Blaustein
support their view by the absence of the qualifying term "armed" in article 2(4), with a host
of documents which either do not have force of law or are in the area of "declaratory resolutions" of the U.N. General Assembly or by documents the relevancy of which, as to the issue,
is minimal, and do not pay attention to e.g., travaux prkparatoires of the Charter. For me
this approach represents not only an unwarranted but also an undesirable erosion of article
2(4). First, it inevitably leads to the "conversion" of article 2(4) into an "umbrella" embracing prohibition of any intervention (e.g., against "political independence of any State," which
can be, of course, interpreted rather broadly) along the lines of General Assembly Resolution
2625 (XXV) (see note 12 infra; my views on this subject appear below). Second, such a view
represents to me an advocacy of the use of armed force in self-defense under article 51 of the
Charter against the use of "economic force" despite the fact that, e.g., Professors Paust and
Blaustein explicitly reject the view that articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter are coextensive.
Paust & Blaustein, supra, at 417. As such, this interpretation of article 2(4) provides addi-
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"march" of unarmed Moroccan civilians into the territory of the
Spanish Sahara in November 1975. Even if the premise is accepted,
some marginal problems can arise." Nevertheless, under the premise, questions of the threat or use of force are substantially questions
of fact, while interpretation of a term such as "territorial integrity"
in the context of article 2(4) in some borderline situations may
depend upon what might be called an ultimate conclusion of law
and fact. For instance, one might think of the unilateral extension
of the breadth of the territorial sea, which is not clearly illegal (e.g.,
from a three to a twelve mile limit) by State A and a claim of an
existing right within the new limit by State B, "supported" by
warships of State B sent to the particular area.
A more difficult and possibly unresolved question is who, apart
from "any state," is the object of the protection of article 2(4), in
view of the phrase "or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." Leaving the intention of the
signatories of the Charter in 1945 aside, current development indicates that protection is accorded to peoples of the colonies which are
subject to the right of self-determination. With the rapid disaptional argument for the law breakers, adds to the already considerable misuse of article 51 of
the Charter, and because of its fuzziness is antithetical to the development of "minimum
order" rules to govern grave international crises involving unilateral use of armed force. Apart
from all that, however, there is no support, in the contemporary practice of states, for the
proposition that states are willing to give up any and all effective means of competition not
involving use of armed force. The norm prohibiting the use of economic "weapons" to influence events elsewhere would be so much divorced from contemporary reality that it would
further enhance disregard for law in general and for the rule of article 2(4) in particular.
Finally, in my view, "economic strangulation" is an entirely phony issue. The Arab boycott
did not strangle Israel. The more serious (in its effects) United States-OAS boycott did not
strangle Cuba. The West was well able to deal by political means with the Arab oil embargo
and had powerful economic sanctions at its disposal. I doubt it seriously that any exhortations
about an article 2(4) violation would have contributed to the solution of that crisis. For those
who are under a compulsion to see a violation of the Charter in any economic action they
dislike, articles 1, paragraph 3, 55, and 56 of the Charter should furnish an adequate ground
for academic polemics.
" Aerial reconnaissance by military planes or planes of a state intelligence agency is, as
Professor Henkin put it, a "violation of a fundamental norm [of international law]." L.
HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 241 (2d printing 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENKIN]. Does it
represent use of force? The "spy satellites" eliminate some of such tactics by the United
States and the USSR. Nevertheless, aerial surveillance is still widely used, although, apart
from the notorious U-2 incident in 1960, it has not generated much controversy.
21 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
"Friendly Relations" Resolution]. See the sixth paragraph of the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples: "The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing
Territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State
administering it." Id. at 124.
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pearance of colonies stricto sensu, this is becoming a moot question.
The difficulty arises with the efforts to extend the protection to
other peoples (other than peoples of the colonies) subjected "to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation"' 3 and with the corresponding claim of the right to render assistance to these peoples,
including armed assistance (in the sense of the use of armed force
in support of these peoples). This claim, as far as armed assistance
is concerned, can be logically formulated only as an exception to
article 2(4). Although some of the problems involved will be discussed below, it may be said that the claim is without merit as far
as the Charter and general international law is concerned. The primary object of the protection of article 2(4) is a state. As opposed
to peoples within the territory whose status is "separate and distinct," the people within a territory of a state form one of the constituent elements of that state and their right of self-determination
can find its expression only in "their right to be left alone" and to
determine for themselves the form of government, the political,
social and economic system, or to dismember the state in question
and establish two or more states, etc.I4 According to the plain meaning of the language of article 2(4), the intent of the actor is irrelevant, except insofar as it may be important with respect to an exception to article 2(4).11 That does not mean that the intent of the
actor need not be important as one of the criteria which could be
used to differentiate between two different actions in violation of
article 2(4) of the Charter, if such a differentiation is at all useful.
For example, at the closing meeting of the Seventh Session of the
Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, the
phrase "other relevant circumstances" in article 2 of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression 6 was un"

Id.

at 124.

The right "to be left alone" is seen by this author as the right protected by article 2(4)
of the Charter only and does not necessarily extend to the protection from any type of outside
interference.
15See Bowa-r, supra note 9, at 150-52. Dr. Bowett cites somewhat different views of the
United Kingdom expressed in the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 5. As to that case see
I. FABELA, INTERVENTION 213 et seq. (1961) [hereinafter cited as FABELA] for the interesting
view of a former judge of the International Court of Justice who participated in the decision.
As will be apparent below, this author agrees with Dr. Bowett's view that the right of selfdefense is an exception to article 2(4) of the Charter. This agreement, however, does not
extend to Dr. Bowett's view of anticipatory self-defense. For Dr. Bowett's citation of (and
polemic with) Lauterpacht (2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht
1965)), see BoWETT, supra note 9, at 152.
1 G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Definition of Aggression]. Article 2 reads:
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derstood to cover animus aggressionisby the representatives of the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR. This view was
opposed by the representatives of Yugoslavia and Mexico, who evidently did not think that the intent of the actor should under any
circumstances be one of the elements of aggression." Be it as it may
with respect to the notion of aggression, there cannot be any doubt
that the intent could help to differentiate, for example, between an
act of aggression and, if viewed as a separate category, an act of
disproportionate anticipatory self-defense.'
The Charter of the United Nations expressly authorizes two exceptions to the prohibition of article 2(4). One, which will be discussed below, is the right of self-defense under article 51 of the
Charter. The other is an action of the Security Council (or under the
auspices of the Security Council which includes action of a Regional
Organization under chapter VIII of the Charter and in conformity
with article 53, paragraph 1 of the Charter) under articles 24 and
39 of the Charter.' 9 If humanitarian intervention is not viewed
within the scope of the right of self-defense, but is considered to be
a separate institution within the limits of general international law,
it may represent another exception to article 2(4) .21 With respect to
a precedent which would create a new exception to article 2(4) of
the Charter, an interesting view has been expressed by Professor
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression although the Security Council may,
in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of
sufficient gravity.
" Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, Provisional Summary Record of the One Hundred and Thirteenth Meeting, April 17, 1974, at 7, 10, 17, 23, 26, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.134/SR.113 [hereinafter cited as Provisional Record].
11The example of "disproportionate anticipatory self-defense" (because of the issue of "the
first use of armed force" in article 2 of the Definition of Aggression, supra note 16) is used to
avoid controversy. The author's view on the legality of anticipatory self-defense appears
below.
"1 The determination of the Security Council under article 39 may be made in any case
involving existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression ("existence of any threat" (emphasis added)); i.e., not only in reaction to the violation of article
2(4). BOwErr, supra note 9, at 176. Conversely, not all violations of article 2(4) need represent
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Another exception originally
authorized by the Charter was that under articles 106 and 107 of the Charter, which deal with
transitional security elements.
" For discussions of humanitarian intervention see, for example, Brownlie, Humanitarian
Intervention, in Moore, supra note 7, at 217, and Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention:A Reply
to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in Moore, supra note 7, at 229.
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Henkin in his treatment of the "Cuban Quarantine" of 1962.1 After
strenuous argument against anticipatory self-defense,2 Professor
Henkin wrote: "the Cuban quarantine will probably not be seen as
a violation leaving the law as it was; probably it will make new law,
but what that law is cannot yet be told. ' 23 However, Professor Henkin adds, "the quarantine lends itself to very cautious 'use' indeed. 2 His conclusion that the quarantine "[a]t its narrowest,
. . . is an assertion that when world peace hangs on a delicate
balance of terror, measures [introduction of Soviet missiles into5
'
Cuba] that threaten substantial destablilization are intolerable
is, of course, the gist of the problem. Such a rationale lends itself
to most serious misuse in the name of "balance of power," "spheres
of interest," etc. While Professor Henkin's principal concern seems
to be with the possible misuse of the Cuban quarantine within the
anticipatory self-defense concept,2" it is submitted that an exception
to article 2(4) based on the balance of power rationale would enlarge
the scope of use of force substantially beyond the limits of anticipatory self-defense. It would be too much of a good thing to expect the
acceptance of such a rationale for facts identical to the Cuban quarantine only. Of purely academic interest may be a question of the
use of force within a territory which is neither a colony or a dependent territory nor a state. A conflict between two armies (of States
A and B) competing for acquisition of terra nullius probably would
be in violation of one of the purposes of the United Nations; namely,
the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. Not that there is
any terra nullius left. The example is mentioned to illustrate the
fact that, if the phrase "or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations" is to be taken literally, there
is not much room left for legal use of force.
The preceding brief exposition of the scope of the prohibition of
article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations indicates bur view
that the prohibition is categorical save for exceptions which are
either specifically authorized by the Charter or embodied in the
existing norm of general international law 27 which is consistent with
21
2

24

2S

HENKIN, supra note 11, ch. XVI & 227 et seq. (particularly).

Id. at 232-36.
IId. at 236.
Id. at 237.
Id.

26 Id.
27 Whether

the norm existed at the time the Charter was signed or developed-as a norm
of general internationallaw-since 1945 is in this author's view irrelevant.
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or, indeed, promotes the principles (or purposes) of the United Nations, as may be, for instance, the case of humanitarian intervention
where the principle specifically promoted loosely may be called that
of respect for human rights.28 The question ultimately to be asked
is whether a rule promoting one principle can coexist with the other
principles of the Charter to the extent of their character as jus
cogens. Within this latter category the development of the normative contents of the right of self-determination deserves separate
treatment since that development expanded the scope of the article
2(4) prohibition and provided some respectability for the claim of
concurrent expansion of the right of states to threaten or to use force
to promote the right of self-determination of other peoples.
"[Tihe principle of self-determination of peoples," to use Dr.
Bowett's words, "[is] regarded by many states as one of the most
fundamental and 'peremptory' norms of contemporary international law. 2' 9 Indeed the principle as such, i.e., apart from particular situations, seems to be recognized by almost all states, with the
inferred exceptions of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal prior to
General Spinola's coup d'etat. With respect to colonies stricto sensu
the principle should be interpreted on the one hand as prohibiting
the colonial power from using any means of suppression to curb the
desire of colonial peoples to attain "a full measure of selfgovernment,"3 0 and on the other hand as sanctioning assistance 3' to
such peoples by the third states for the purpose stated. As has been
already mentioned, this is becoming a moot question. The qualifying term stricto sensu is used here because this author believes that
the regime of peoples living in annexed territories which prior to
annexation had been independent states, especially in the case of
Soviet annexations of, e.g., Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, is a
colonial regime. This question is not a moot question, but any discussion of the subject would be a waste of time. 32
" U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
" Bowett, The Interrelationof Theories of Intervention and Self-Defense, in Moore, supra
note 7, at 42 [hereinafter cited as Bowett, Interrelation].
U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
, Article 73 of the U.N. Charter qualifies the duty of members of the United Nations "to
promote . . . the well-being of the inhabitants [of non-self-governing territories] and, to this
end . . . to develop self-government" by limitation "within the system of international peace
and security."
" Many years ago I read memoires of pre-World War II Italian diplomat Daniele Var6,
which in English would probably be entitled "The Laughing Diplomat." Mr. Var6 was the
Secretary of the Italian delegation to the League of Nations in the 1920's and described the
debate on the so called "Armenian question." The "question" was Soviet annexation of
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The principle of self-determination extends, in any sensible interpretation, beyond the peoples under the colonial regime. As a universal principle of the Charter it must apply to peoples of any nation
and to any significant (in terms of numbers, geography, etc.) minority of homogeneous origin, culture, etc. within a state. Does State
A have a right to assist any group in State B, or "majority" of the
population under the government of State B, in order to promote
realization of the right of self-determination? The question, of
course, relates to rebellions and revolutions, civil wars, and to the
efforts to foment civil strife in order to weaken a politically or ideologically hostile state or to secure succession to power by a friendly
group.
The question of legality of intervention by one state on behalf of
either the government of or the challenger within another state and
the question of rights and duties of third states has become one of
the most controversial issues of current international law. The legal
analysis, it is submitted, must be based on recognition of three
different situations" which may not be different for the purposes of
a social scientist's analysis, but which are entirely different under
international law. In the first situation the delictual conduct of
State A against State B creates in State B the right of self-defense
under article 51 of the Charter. State C "intervenes" on behalf of
State B in exercise of the right of collective self-defense according
to a treaty between States B and C. This problem will be explored
in part II of this article. In the second situation State A intervenes
in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter either on behalf of the
legitimate government of State B or on behalf of the challenger
within State B and justifies its conduct either (a) by its right to
promote self-determination of "people" or (b) by invitation by the
legitimate government. This problem will be explored in this part
of the article. In the third situation State A renders assistance either
Armenia with attendant mass murders. During the debate Mr. Var6 circulated among his
friends his private "resolution" which, if my memory serves me well, read along these lines:
Article one: The League of Nations shall be notified of any killing of Armenians four weeks
in advance. Article two: The League of Nations shall be notified of any killings involving more
than 10,000 Armenians six weeks in advance. Article three: Any killing of Armenians in
violation of articles one and two of this resolution shall be null and void; i.e., regarded as if
it did not happen.
1. See Bowett, Interrelation,supra note 29, at 38 et seq. Dr. Bowett differentiates between
international conflicts and internal conflicts. Within internal conflicts he differentiates between intervention by consent of the established government, intervention to assist a struggle
for self-determination, and humanitarian intervention. Dr. Bowett's and my categories overlap but not entirely. The same is true about the conclusions.
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to the legitimate government of State B or its challenger, but the
action of State A does not violate article 2(4) of the Charter. This
problem will be mentioned in part III below.
A.

Intervention to Promote Self-determination of "People"

The notion of the independent, sovereign state is a legal fiction.
The fiction attaches (1) to a state-as opposed to a colony or a state
of a federation, be it Bavaria or, e.g., the Belorussian and Ukrainian
Soviet Republics, the "nonsense" of their membership in the United
Nations notwithstanding-and (2) to a sovereign state. Sovereignty
in the legal sense simply denotes formal independence, or more
precisely-if I may use a strained colloquialism-lack of formal dependence." For example, the state under the regime of a protectorate or a state-member of a confederation, which transferred the
exercise of its external sovereignty to organs of the confederation are
not sovereign states or at least not fully sovereign states, as the case
may be. In that sense the fiction incorporates a conclusive presumption that the state is a sovereign state unless it is formally dependent (pursuant to a treaty, pursuant to a de jure occupation regime
unilaterally imposed as in the case of postwar Germany prior to the
emergence of the two German states, etc.). As it is true with any
legal fiction, there are few cases in which the fiction is totally divorced from reality (and as long as there are only a few exceptional
cases the fiction is viable as reflecting usual situations). Hungary
and Czechoslovakia are par excellence examples of states whose
dependence has been demonstrated and which are clearly and unequivocally under the regime of de facto suzerainty. Their problem,
so to speak, does not fit the problem discussed in this article for two
reasons. One is that each act of armed intervention of the suzerain
is part of a continuous and illegal status which poses a different
problem than acts of intervention in the proper sense of that word;
the other is that any discussion of this issue would be a waste of time
as mentioned earlier with respect to annexed territories. However,
with respect to most states the fiction works well indeed, even if it
sometimes appears that a particular state is a "dependent" state
because it is within the "sphere of interest" of a "super-power" etc.
For example, in the early 1950's the People's Republic of China had
" The view that a state's de jure sovereignty depends on its ability to exercise it (cf. article
4, paragraph 1 of the U.N. Charter) is indefensible. Even United Nations practice under
article 4 of the Charter has always been (from the two Soviet republics mentioned earlier to
the last admitted ministate) contrary to the rule itself.
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been considered to be a Soviet satellite; prior to Castro's victory,
Cuba was within the sphere of influence of the United States both
in fact and under the Monroe, Truman, and Eisenhower doctrines.
One may make a cautious reference to Rumania, although it is yet
to be seen how far Rumanian "courage" or Soviet "tolerance" is
going to go. All three states demonstrated their independence (in
the case of Rumania, a measure of independence). In this connection it must be remembered that the notion of state in this context
is not synonymous with the notion of government. Although "government" is one of the constituent elements of a state, it is not, as
such, the independent subject of protection of article 2(4) of the
Charter. As long as a state's personality according to international
law continues without a change, i.e., for purposes of continuity
under international law the state does not lose its identity, occasional periods of uncertainty as to the legitimate government are
irrelevant.
This author believes that there are two approaches to the normative solution of the problem of the unilateral threat or use of force
to promote the right of self-determination of peoples within the
territory of a sovereign state. The first one lies in the determination
of whether, as between two or more groups, one has under international law a superior right to self-determination than the other(s).
The question does not deserve an answer. The only possible solution
to the conflicting claims within a state is to allow the sum total of
the legal and extralegal processes to take their course. It has to be
remembered that the purpose of civil strife is not only to determine
the "victor" but also to change the power structure, which is often
achieved in a manner that reflects a compromise between competing factions, although rarely immediately after the victory of one
faction. An armed intervention of another state on behalf of one
group is, in this conception, tantamount to a suppression of the
right of self-determination of any other group or the entire population. This conclusion, of course, can be made only under the assumption that there are at least two groups with competing views
on self-determination of each of them or self-determination of "all
people" within the state's territory. In other words the conclusion
should fall, it might be argued, if the government of the state in
question "rules" against the will of almost the entire population,
which would be possible only if it "ruled" de facto on behalf of
another state. Such a conclusion, i.e., that of dependency, cannot
be left to any other state. In that sense the fiction of a sovereign
state operates as a denial of a "right" to rebut the presumption of
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sovereignty. If the situation is such that an outside action is imperative, there is an organ which can authorize such action on behalf of
the United Nations, which in fact, nowadays, means on behalf of the
international community: the Security Council under article 39 of
the Charter."'
The second approach lies in the relationship of article 2(4) of the
Charter, the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of selfdetermination of peoples. As has been mentioned already, the primary object of the protection of article 2(4) is a state. That protection is not qualified, for example, by the requirement that the state
act consistently with the principles and purposes of the United Nations unless, of course, the delictual conduct is such that it permits
armed response under article 51 of the Charter. With respect to the
relationship of the principles of sovereignty and self-determination
of peoples, neither in the Charter nor in the travaux pr~paratoires
is there any suggestion that the principle of self-determination
should take precedence over the principle of sovereignty; quite to
the contrary, sovereignty has been regarded as the cornerstone of
modem international law." In fact, prior to the U.N. Charter, the
colonies had been regarded as part of the territory of the colonial
power; the travaux prdparatoiresof the Charter do not reflect any
support for the "rights" of third states to threaten or use force on
behalf of the peoples even of the colonies; consequently, the Charter
itself is far from being clear on the subject of colonies, while it is
quite clear on the question of respect for sovereignty. The normative
contents of the right of self-determination of peoples have developed
only in the last 20 or 25 years. And there is not the slightest doubt
that the international community did not develop a consensus, either by way of amendments to the Charter or by way of consistent
behavior-if one ignores the concept of jus cogens and the procedure
for amending the Charter, as to the limitation of sovereignty in favor
of the "right" of third states to promote self-determination of peoples, other than those in the colonies, contrary to the prohibition of
article 2(4) of the Charter. As of the time of this writing, the Organization of African Unity was evenly split on the question of foreign
intervention in Angola." There is not a single example since World
11Cf.

Bowett, Interrelation,supra note 29, at 44.
Friedmann, Comment 4, in Moore, supra note 7, at 574 [hereinafter cited as Friedmanni.
11 Parley on Angola Ends Without Decision, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 5. OAU
recognition of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola was extended after the
victory of that faction on February 11, 1976. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
3
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War II where the overwhelming majority of states approved of foreign armed intervention within the context here discussed. Perhaps
the most persuasive example is that of the India-Pakistan war in
1971. There was a long history of denial of proportionate representation to the population of East Pakistan by the central government;
the parliamentary elections before the war were frustrated by the
central government; the elections clearly demonstrated the overwhelming popular support in East Pakistan for those who finally
emerged as leaders of Bangladesh; there was a documented history
of economic neglect of East Pakistan by the government; the majority of people in East Pakistan were of different national origin than
those in West Pakistan; and the popular uprising was being brutally
suppressed. As Professor Friedmann pointed out, there was "the
universally felt revulsion against the behavior of the Pakistani
forces toward its own citizens." 3 Yet the General Assembly of the
United Nations in its Resolution 2793 (XXVI) of December 7, 1971
called "upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of
their armed forces on the territory of the other to their own side of
the India-Pakistan borders."39 In the preambular part of the Resolution, among other things, the General Assembly referred to article
2(4) of the Charter and recognized "the need to deal appropriately
at a subsequent stage, within the framework of the Charter of the
United Nations, with the issues which have given rise to the hostilities."40 The vote in the General Assembly was 104 in favor of the
Resolution, 11 against, with 10 abstentions. Thus, the General Assembly believed that status quo ante should be restored, at least in
part because of the prohibition of article 2(4) of the Charter (apart
from the desire to maintain peace), and despite the brutal suppression of the Bengalis in East Pakistan. At the same time, the General
Assembly believed, one might infer, that the issue of selfdetermination of the Bengalis in East Pakistan should be resolved,
but resolved by peaceful means ("within the framework of the
Charter"). In view of the time such solution might take, one may
see the temptation to solve the problem by a quick action, with the
I Friedmann, supra note 36, at 574. Professor Friedmann's conclusion was that "India's
action was illegal, but morally condonable." Id. at 579. However, he also wrote: "fit hardly
can be denied) that this intervention also served India's long standing purpose of weakening
Pakistan and creating a friendly, but necessarily beholden, country on its northeastern frontier." Id. at 577.
" Resolution 2793, supra note 8, para. 1.
Id. preamble (emphasis added).
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reasonable reliance on inaction of the United Nations subsequent to
fait accompli. Nevertheless, the reasonable inference (in view of the
history of the relations between the two states) that India acted with
ulterior motives apart from laudable concern for the Bengalis, provides a moral and sociological justification for the action of the
General Assembly and shows that the rules of international law here
discussed are not contradictory to or entirely divorced from the
ideas of "justice."
The basic issue in the relationship of the principles of sovereignty
and self-determination of peoples is not the desirability of a juxtaposition of peace and justice, but the need to protect the concept of
sovereignty from being swallowed by the principle of selfdetermination distorted in the rhetoric of the leaders of quite a
number of nations and gravely misused by the actions of some of
them.
B.

Intervention by Invitation by the Legitimate Government

It may be said at the outset that this author agrees with many
others that invitation by the legitimate government does not justify
armed intervention to suppress the right of self-determination. 4'
While, as has been emphasized above, the principle of selfdetermination cannot swallow the principle of sovereignty, the principle of sovereignty equally cannot swallow the principle of selfdetermination and the prohibition of threat or use of force in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
Strictly speaking, sovereignty" actually is not involved since the
right of self-determination has become a matter of international
concern, regulated by international law, and, therefore, not a matter
within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Nevertheless, this does
not mean that a state cannot, at the bona fide invitation of the
legitimate government of another state, use force within the territory of that other state, in joint exercise of, say, the police power of
the latter state in an affair which is exclusively internal. Apart from
"nonpolitical lawlessness and banditry, 4' 3 drug traffic, etc., in the
" See, among many others, Bowett, Interrelation,supra note 29, at 42; Friedmann, supra
note 36, at 576; cf. Farer, HarnessingRogue Elephants: A Short Discourse on Foreign Intervention in Civil Strife, 82 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Farer].
12 Sovereignty in this context is related to the right of the state to do whatever it pleases
with respect to matters which are essentially within its domestic jurisdiction and, therefore,
through its government to invite any state to assist it in suppression of an internal "rebellion." Because of the internationalization of the concept of self-determination, the right of
the invited state to assist ceased to exist.
'1 Bowett, Interrelation,supra note 29, at 42.
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contemporary political climate, there may be some cases when the
right of a state to intervene pursuant to a legitimate invitation will
be controversial. For example, State A may assist State B in the
territory of State B in suppression of an international terrorist
group; State B may request State A to send a small military contingent to guard A's embassy in B or a dam in B which A is helping to
build; that military contingent, it is believed, may use minimal
force on a strictly defensive basis in protecting the embassy or the
dam, even against an insurgent group. On the other hand, a larger
military force of State A stationed in B pursuant to B's request may
(or may not) represent an intangible but real threat of force aimed
at a challenger (or potential challenger) of B's government, without
a single instance of the firing of a gun. The criterion simply is
whether or not the behavior of the invited state, in conjunction with
the behavior of the assisted state, violates the principle of selfdetermination." Such is largely a question of fact and of evaluation
of the political history of the country in question. For example, in
view of the history of the political struggle in Indochina it was patently clear that Vietcong activities within South Vietnam-from the
earliest stage on-represented a political challenge to the government. In doubtful cases, it is believed, the presumption should be
against intervention.
Rhetoric and illegal acts of states may cloud the issues but cannot
change the normative character and contents of the rules discussed.
It is regrettable that the General Assembly of the United Nations
succumbed to rhetoric and adopted, in a few major resolutions,
"rules" designed to interpret the Charter and general international
law, which in fact not only are contentless in the sense that they do
not reflect any measure of agreement among states, but also, by
their mere existence, provide additional fuel for rhetoricians and
law breakers. For example, article 7 of the Definition of Aggression45
reads:
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in
any way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and
independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly
deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and CoopThe action'may be illegal for other reasons, such as the violation of the principle of
respect for human rights in a police action which is not contrary to the principle of selfdetermination.
11 Note 16 supra.
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eration among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or
other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to
struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance
with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the
above-mentioned Declaration.
"The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples"
of the "Friendly Relations" Resolution"6 does not really add anything to article 7 of the Definition of Aggression, except that it
relates to a much wider concept which includes, for example, the
scope of article 2(4) of the Charter. Apart from the "separate and
distinct" concept of the colonies, it is a clutter of reaffirmations of
sovereignty, principles of the Charter, and such sentences as
"[elvery State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, the realization of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter, . . ."I'

The measure of disagreement on fundamental provisions in the
Definition of Aggression was exemplified by the remarks of members of the Special Committee at its closing session and must be
apparent to a layman with mediocre intelligence who reads document A/AC.134/SR.11348 of April 17, 1974. With respect to article 7
of the Definition, some statements made should be specifically mentioned. The French representative believed that "[a]rticle 7 was a
safeguarding clause, essentially political in nature . . . . As
drafted, the safeguarding clause seemed in fact alien to the text of
the Definition, since it was not concerned with aggression as defined
in article 1, i.e., between sovereign states. He nevertheless appreciated the legal necessity of having such a clause."" (Legal necessity?!) Representatives of the United States, Australia, and Canada
in essence explicitly rejected the notion that article 7 does legitimize
the use of force against a sovereign state. 0 In fact, the Canadian
representative stated that "his Government interpreted the reference to struggle in Article 7 as being struggle by peaceful means,
and did not regard the formulation as condoning the use of force in
situations other than in self-defense or other than in accordance

" Note 12 supra.

,7 Id. para. 2.
'
Provisional Record, supra note 17.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8, 18, 20-21.
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with the Charter." 5 ' Representatives of Yugoslavia, the United
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Egypt made, in the context of the
problem, rather ambiguous statements.2 The Algerian representative stated:
With respect to Article 7 in particular, it should be noted that the
exercise of the right of self-determination must be placed on the
same footing as self-defense and included not only the right of
peoples subject to any form of alien domination to resort to armed
force, but also the right and the duty of5all States Members of the
United Nations to assist those peoples. 1
To be sure, the sentences and words of article 7 of the Definition
of Aggression or those in the "Friendly Relations" Resolution are not
per se objectionable, especially in view of the reaffirmations in both
resolutions that nothing in the resolutions should be construed as
enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter. The resolutions
may be considered to be a positive step in the development of international understanding by virtue of extensive debate during their
formulation-debate which made it possible for states to express
their views and forced the states to express their political views in
legal categories, etc. The resolutions also reflect a few understandings which some have considered significant.54 Yet the escape
clauses, referring to the promotion of self-determination, reflect precisely the justifications of illegal intervenors for their actions. One
can imagine those waving the resolutions and thundering on the
forum of the General Assembly and elsewhere about their contributions to the oppressed "peoples" through the use of force against
"imperalists," "racists," "zionists," etc. Had there not been so
many people dead and suffering as the results of flagrant aggressions, occupations, and illegal interventions in the name of "selfdetermination" one could find an amusing element in all of this: In
1951, the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission,
Mr. J. Spiropoulos, concluded in his second report:
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 9, 11, 17, 23, 27.
' Id. at 25.
lines
' See, e.g., the duty "to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate international
of demarcation, such as armistice lines . . . " in the first principle (paragraph 5) of the
"Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12. See Rusk, The 25th U.N. GeneralAssembly
and the Use of Force, 2 (supp. 1) GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 19, 25 (1972). In the article, the
former Secretary of State expressed his support for the Resolution and examined elements
which influence the "declaratory" (in a sense "legal") character of the Resolution. Id. at 30
et seq.
'
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the natural notion of aggression is a concept per se which is inherent to any human mind and which as a primary notion, is not
susceptible of definition. Consequently, whether the behavior of a
state is to be considered as an "aggression under international law"
has to be decided

. . .

on the basis of the above notion which, to

sum it up, is rooted in the "feeling" of the governments concerned. ."

We have a definition now. It seems, however, that the world is in
need of another one, defining who are the peoples subjected "to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation"5 who are entitled
to receive armed assistance." Feelings of the governments concerned seem to differ on that question. Feelings of ordinary men
may not.
The hypocritical attitude of states applauding" the mentioned
and similar resolutions 9 is enough to call into question the character
of these resolutions as "declaratory resolutions" even if one accepts,
in principle, the concept of "declaratory resolutions of the General
Assembly," despite articles 10, 11(1), and 13(1) of the U.N.
Charter."' It should be emphasized, however, that there are more
instances in which the votes of the Western powers for certain resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly represent what this author
calls a "Soviet style political convenience vote" (or more charitably
a vote for an "ultimate goal" without regard for the current contents
of the resolution).'
11 (Second) Report on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, [19511 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 43, 68, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4143 (1951). For the
critique of this view and arguments in favor of defining aggression see Schwebel, Aggression,
Intervention and Self-defence in Modern InternationalLaw, in 136 ACAD9MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS

411 (1972).

"Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, at 121.
1 See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
' The "Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, and the Definition of Aggression,
supra note 16, were adopted by acclamation.
11 Cf. FALK, supra note 2, at 7. Professor Falk referred to the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 14, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Resolution 21311.
' For a brief and concise treatment of the concept of "declaratory resolutions" see, for
example, de Visscher, Cours General de Droit InternationalPublic, in 136 ACADOMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 125-33 (1972).
" For example, the United States, after having voted against the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974), voted affirmatively on Resolution 3362, Development and International Economic Co-operation, adopted by the Seventh Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly
on September 16, 1975 (the resolution may be found in 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1524 (1975)).
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As must have been noticed, the question of armed intervention of
State A within the territory of State B to counter an armed intervention of State C has not been explicitly raised. As a matter of principle (and law) it is believed that one violation of the law does not
sanction another violation of the law. However, one would have to
be totally blind, deaf, and living in a cage not to recognize the
problem of a small state on the one hand exposed to illegal intervention of states which make it a habit to intervene in order to expand
their sphere of influence and dominate others, and on the other
hand being able to hope only for the attention in the form of an
obituary in the newspapers of the law-abiding states. If there were
some completely moral, virtuous, and exceptionally "nice" small
states and big states it would be easy to justify interventions in
response. At least some legal philosophers would dispose of the international lawyer's problem by application of the maxim cessat
rationis cessat lex. 2 Though there are not any completely "nice"
states, one's identification with certain values makes a conclusion
inescapable that there are states whose value systems are so close
to ours that, for example, the United States may find it unable not
to assist them by any and all means (sometimes, perhaps, quite
apart from the question of its security). This problem has been dealt
with by some authors by suggestions of partly subjective criteria to
be applied to the determination of the legality of intervention (not
only armed intervention). Professor Moore's Applied Theory for
Regulation of Intervention3 is one such approach. Nevertheless, no
matter what one's sentiment is, one must agree with Professor Farer
that once the door to subjective determinations is open, one "finds
whatever it was that he wanted to find," 4 since there has never been
a government which at all times resisted the temptation of manipulation of law. Professor Sohn's proposal de lege ferenda65 not only
The resolution was adopted unanimously. At the same time the United States announced
some rather serious reservations to the resolution. For the text of Ambassador Myerson's
statement see 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 557, 558 (1975). See also the answers of Assistant Secretary of State Enders at a news conference held on December 16, 1975 at the U.N. headquarters
by Ambassador Moynihan and Mr. Enders. Id. at 566.
62 The "rule of reason," of course, had its genesis in the natural law jurisprudence of the
16th, 17th, and 18th centuries (R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 219-20 (3d ed. 1970)) and
lies behind the concepts of Grotius. In common law, it is often said, the concept as a rule
originated in Lord Parker's decision in Mitchell v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
"' See Moore, Toward an Applied Theory for the Regulation of Intervention, in Moore,
supra note 7, at 3. See also Farer, On Professor Moore's Synthesis, in id. at 549; Moore, On
Professor Farer's Need for a Thesis: A Reply, in id. at 565.
" Farer, supra note 41, at 523.
' Sohn, Civil Wars: Guidelines for States and the United Nations, in Moore, supra note
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retains the subjective element ("extreme emergency," "requiring
instant response") but also presumes United Nations action, which
for the near future seems unlikely, at least in controversial situations. As for the regional organizations, their "virtues" are seriously
doubted. This author proposes to deal with the problem by way of
short-term bilateral mutual self-defense treaties if a "superpower"
is a party or by way of collective self-defense treaties if a "superpower" is not involved. The reasons for his preference appear in part
II below. With that understanding, this author supports, in the
context discussed, Professor Farer's "categorical norm," i.e., absolute prohibition of the use of armed force but "legitimation of aid
short of tactical support." 6
II.

SELF-DEFENSE

The right of self-defense under international law is a right belonging to a state. Its exercise is directed against delictual conduct of
another state and aimed at restoration or preservation of the status
quo." Since The Caroline affair it has been maintained that the
right of self-defense is limited to situations in which "necessity of
that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means and no moment for deliberation"" and that self-defense must
not be unreasonable or excessive. The latter requirement of proportionality has been recognized in traditional international law69 and
in fact has never been challenged.
The requirement that self-defense be aimed at restoration of the
status quo disturbed by delictual conduct of another state distinguishes self-defense from punitive actions aimed at enforcement of
legal rights, most notably sanctions. ' " In that sense, quite obviously,
defensive action within the limits of self-defense can involve use of
7, at 582. Professor Sohn's "basic principle" for "non-intervention" reads: "No military
intervention by one state in an internal armed conflict in another is permissible, except in
an extreme emergency action on request of the United Nations or an appropriate regional
organization." Id. at 582.
" Farer, supra note 41, at 532-36.
'
BOWETT, supra note 9, at 11. Dr. Bowett's work is a major monograph on self-defense,
although some of his conclusions are highly controversial. For Dr. Bowett's "characteristics"
of self-defense see id. at 269. See also Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J.
IN-T'L L. 39, 54 (1933).
" Note of Secretary of State Webster to Lord Ashburton, in Destructionof the "Caroline,"
2 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409, 412 (1906).
" BowEirr, supra note 9, at 118.
71 See generally id. at 11 et seq. Th term "sanction"
is used by this author to denote any
lawful action taken to enforce a legal right and coincides with Dr. Bowett's expression "other
forms of self-help."
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means other than the threat or use of force. On the other hand, and
quite apart from the United Nations Charter, it is difficult to imagine, in view of the requirement of proportionality, that a state could
use force in lawful exercise of the right of self-defense against other
delictual conduct than that involving the use of force (or possibly
the threat of force).7
A.

Proportionalityof Self-Defense

Proportionality of self-defense in relation to delictual action distinguishes lawful self-defense from an action which originated as
self-defense but, because of the disproportionate coercion involved,
becomes delictual itself. Proportionality does not require that the
state acting in self-defense employ the minimum force necessary to
restore the status quo at the expense of effectivity. All that is required is that the defensive action be reasonable in view of the
circumstances, which should include recognition that in certain situations the victim's reaction would be logically stronger than in
other situations. For instance if State B is a victim of aggression and
forces of State A actually invaded B's territory, B's desire to liberate
its territory as quickly and effectively as possible and, consequently,
B's employment of all legal means at its disposal to achieve that
goal can hardly be considered objectionable. However, if B succeeds
in repulsing the enemy beyond its borders but hostilities continue
outside of B's territory, the standard of proportionality should be
much stricter (e.g., reasonable force necessary to achieve a ceasefire, etc.). In that sense the standard of proportionality is flexible,
but even the most flagrant aggression of A against B, even perhaps
accompanied by A's intention to occupy B, will hardly justify B's
occupation of A. In conclusion, as Professors McDougal and Feliciano pointed out, proportionality relates to "magnitude and intensity" and not to "similarity or dissimilarity of weapons employed.""2
However, this author believes, save in the extreme case (in response
to a nuclear attack) the means employed must be legal, and the
targets attacked must not be those protected by international law.
The law involved in the event of the use of armed force generally
will be the principle of respect for human rights as applicable to
armed conflicts and in particular the rules of the law of war.7" It
But see id. at 24, 148-49.
r M. McDoUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 241, 244 (1961)

Ihereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & FELICIANO].
71Professor Schwarzenberger uses a classical classification of limitation with regard to the
conduct of armed operations: limitations ratione loci, ratione instrumenti (which, according
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should be added that on the one hand legality or illegality of military action under the rules of the law of war may determine whether
the defensive action is proportionate. Deliberate and massive bombardment of the population centers of the attacker by the military
forces of the victim may be an example, in usual circumstances. On
the other hand the two categories are not coextensive. For example,
the destruction of a field hospital by the state exercising the right
of self-defense need not affect, in a particular case, the proportionality of self-defense, but in violation of a rule of the law of war and as
such it may be a delictual act for which the defending state is
responsible. This author does not want to guess how far apart or how
close this view is to Professor Falk's repeated emphasis on "the
technological level of sophistication" in relation to proportionality.7 4
Professor Falk developed this concept in the context of his "insurgency-counter-insurgency" theory relating to civil wars, though, in
the case of Vietnam, in relation to a very much internationalized
conflict. That may be, although it is seriously doubted, a distinguishing factor from, at least, a case of uncontroverted self-defense
against an "armed attack." It would be difficult to accept a proposition that a state victim of a massive attack by guerillas with automatic rifles and short range missiles should ground its supersonic
bombers rather than bomb the points of concentration of the invader within and outside of its territory. While everyone with any
humanistic tendencies must deplore destruction caused by current
means of warfare, it seems that some American authors find it altogether too difficult to believe that for some people it is well worth
risking their lives, villages, etc. for preservation of certain other
values, which for them may be as real as a human life, and that such
people would be more than grateful for any assistance they receive.
to Professor Schwarzenberger, cover the use of nuclear weapons) and ratione personae. G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-02 (5th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as SCHWARZENBERGER1. No position is taken (by this author) on the issues whether or not
particular conventional rules of law of war became part of customary international law and
whether the reciprocity requirement ("si omnes") is still tenable.
7 See, e.g., Falk, Comment One, in Moore, supra note 7, at 539, 539-41. See generally Falk,
The Cambodian Operation and International Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Falk, Cambodian Operationj, where other issues pertaining to self-defense also are
discussed. For an opposing view with respect to the 1970 invasion of Cambodia see Moore,
Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 1971
[hereinafter cited as Moore, Legal Dimensionsl.
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Article 51 of the U.N. Charterand Anticipatory Self-defense

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter75 expressly takes the use
of force in exercise of the right of self-defense out of the prohibition
of article 2(4) of the Charter. That much is clear. Otherwise, the rule
of article 51 has been subject to a number of controversies. Due to
the limitations of this paper, only the problem of the use of force in
"anticipatory" self-defense and collective self-defense will be mentioned infra.
Irrespective of whether article 51 of the Charter is declaratory of
the right of self-defense prior to the Charter or whether it restricted
the scope of the prior right,7" it is incontestable that it does not
contain a definition of self-defense. It has been mentioned above
that under the requirement of proportionality it would be difficult
to justify the defensive use of force against delictual conduct not
involving the use or threat of force. The controversial phrase of
article 51 of the Charter-"if an armed attack occurs"-specifically
authorizes use of armed force in self-defense against armed attack.
Does it preclude the use of armed force in self-defense against the
threat of force? The literal reading of the sentence excludes the
response by use of force even if the threat of force (in violation of
article 2(4) of the Charter) is against the territorial integrity or
political independence of the victim; i.e., the exception of article 51
is interpreted in the narrowest sense possible-only in the case of
armed attack.77 Professor Schwarzenberger goes so far in his interpretation of the intent of the United Nations at San Francisco as to
say that "unless a threat or use of armed force is in self-defense or
collective self-defense against armed attack . . . it is illegal and,
7'Article 51 reads:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
71See the discussion of those problems in Bow'rr, supra note 9, ch. IX.
,7 See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 11, at 232; H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS
269, 797-98 (1950) thereinafter cited as KELSENI; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ORDER 164 (1971); Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 878 (1947). For opposing views see, for
example, BOWETT, supra note 9, ch. IX; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 72, at 232-41;

Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
ACAD9MIE DE Daorr INTERNATIONAL, RECUEIL DES COURS 455, 498 (1952).
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under the Charter of the United Nations, constitutes an act of aggression.""
Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression" does not seem to support
this proposition, yet the fact that "in the light of other relevant
circumstances including the fact that the acts concerned or their
consequences are not of sufficient gravity," 0 the first use of armed
force may not be determined by the Security Council to constitute
an act of aggression, does not solve the problem, since such first use
of armed force may still be in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter.
Yet it seems to be of some significance that the General Assembly
believed that there may be circumstances in which the first use of
armed force would not constitute an act of aggression. One might
argue that such an attitude represents at least a recognition that
even under international law, the first use of armed force may be
at least partly justifiable; furthermore, one might argue that if the
Security Council can take into account "other relevant circumstances" in the determination of whether an act of aggression occurred,
the Council or another international body equally can conclude that
article 2(4) has not been violated under all the circumstances. The
question is however, if the door is opened, how wide should it be
opened? If anticipatory self-defense were in fact within the scope of
article 51, it seems inconceivable that it would be so in any other
situation than when the armed attack were so imminent and the
danger so overwhelming that the threatened state would indeed
have no choice of means and no moment of deliberation. In other
words, in cases of anticipatory self-defense which would represent
the first use of armed force (at least, were it not an action in selfdefense, against the territorial integrity or political independence of
the allegedly threatening state)," l the danger of obliteration" of the
threatened state must be real, the threatening state must be in a
position to obliterate the threatened state, the threatening state
must have the means to obliterate the threatened state, and there
must be sufficient evidence to support the belief of the intended
victim that the threatening state made the decision to attack.
While the foregoing has been said (perhaps not in so many words)
by most authors, it is submitted that that is where the problem lies.
G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 164 (1971).
"' Note 16 supra.
" Id. art. 2.
" As opposed to the first use of force, e.g., against a warship on the high seas (although, of
course, in such case the requirements of self-defense would have to be complied with also).
11HENKIN, supra note 11, at 233.
71
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Philosophizing whether the United States can attack first if it is
about to be attacked by the USSR is not only useless, but it also
would be with us even if article 51 of the Charter read in part "we
said armed attack and not the threat of force and we mean it." 3 The
problem is that in the overwhelming majority of cases when anticipatory self-defense was invoked, the self proclaimed victim not only
had sufficient time for deliberations, but any threat of armed attack
which could lead to its obliteration was far less than credible. To
use an extreme example, it has been suggested that the USSR probably accepted the concept of anticipatory self-defense since in the
case of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia "there certainly existed
no 'armed attack'." 84 Even if one ignored the requirements of proportionality, that there be no time for deliberation, etc., the question to be asked is: is it at all conceivable that Czechoslovakia could
attack or could threaten to attack the Soviet Union? The use of that
case in support of the proposition that the USSR in practice accepted the concept of anticipatory self-defense is a complete negation of the traditional concept of self-defense, even if article 51 of
the Charter and, indeed, the whole controversy surrounding anticipatory self-defense is completely ignored. Such a view eliminates
any difference between an armed intervention and self-defense; it
stands for the proposition that the right to use armed force in selfdefense extends to the protection of any interest, anywhere, and is
totally unrelated to the problem of whether, under article 51, a state
can use armed force in self-defense against the threat of force, or
better to say, the threat of an armed attack. It should be added that
the assumption that the USSR accepted the concept of anticipatory
self-defense in the context of invasion of Czechoslovakia is wholly
unwarranted. The concepts of the "Socialist internationalism" and
the "superior order" to the order represented by contemporary jus
cogens of the "law of coexistence"" represent a doctrinal effort to
Cf id.
" Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,4 n.8 (1972).
This reference is not meant to convey an impression that Dr. Bowett suggested that the
invasion of Czechoslovakia would in fact be within his extensive concept of anticipatory selfdefense.
" See G. TUNKIN, TEORIIA MEZHDUNARODNOVO PRAVA chs. XIX-XX (1970) [hereinafter cited
as TUNKINI. See also Butler, Soviet Attitudes towards Intervention, in Moore, supra note 7,
at 380, 393-95. Compare Professor Hazard's review of Mezhdinarodnoe Pravo (G. Tunkin ed.
1974) in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 203 (1975). Otherwise, socialist authors do not pay a great deal of
attention to the nuances of self-defense in general and of article 51 of the Charter in particular. However, in the recent Czechoslovak treatise on international law the author concluded
that under article 51 of the Charter the use of armed force in self-defense is limited to response
to an armed attack. M. POTOCNY, MEZINARODNI PRAVO VEREJNE 119-22 (1973).
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build a new exception to article 2(4) of the Charter, by the institution of a "new, superior type" of regional international law; abstracting from Tunkin's rhetoric,"6 one can see on the one hand the
balance of power argument (one can recall Professor Henkin's treatment of the Cuban quarantine) and on the other hand an ideological
concept in its form not too different from western theories of "modernization."8 7
Under a fairly reasonable assumption that Israeli forces attacked
first, the 1967 "Six Day War" in this author's view is the only
instance when anticipatory self-defense could have been claimed
under any reasonable interpretation of that concept in conjunction
with articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter. The war was preceded by
many unfriendly and probably illegal acts such as the closing of the
Suez Canal to Israeli ships and the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba.
At the request of Egypt the U.N. emergency forces stationed on the
border between Egypt and Israel were recalled. Massive Egyptian
forces moved towards the Israeli border. Egyptian military equipment-notably tanks and war planes-was sufficient to pose a serious threat to the very small territory of Israel, its population centers,
etc. Anti-Israeli hysteria, nurtured by President Nasser prior to the
war, justified the belief that Egyptian motivation was to destroy
Israel. Reliance on the United Nations must have been doubted not
only because of the probability of a Soviet veto in the Security
Council, but also because of the active role that Secretary-General
U Thant played in the withdrawal of the U.N. emergency forces.
Hardly anybody believed that the war could have been averted. In
other words there was a threat of imminent armed attack and a
reasonably presumed intention of the threatening state to destroy
the intended victim, the threatening state was assumed to have
means to carry out its intention, and there were not sufficiently
effective international efforts to avert the war. The Israeli action at
the beginning (i.e., the first use of armed force) was proportionate
although refusal to relinquish the occupied territories after the
cease-fire was probably illegal.
There are also some arguments against the first use of armed force
in that case. For example, some of the Egyptian armed forces, notably the air force, did not seem fully prepared to attack. In retro" See Tunkin's phraseology. TUNKIN, supra note 85.
17See, e.g., Black, The Relevance of Theories of Modernization for Normative and Institutional Efforts at the Control of Intervention, in Moore, supra note 7, at 53. For questions
raised by Professor Friedmann while commenting on Professor Black's study see Friedmann,
supra note 36, at 580-81.
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spect, the results of the 1973 "Yom Kippur War" demonstrated that
more numerous, better equipped and better trained Arab forces
were not a serious challenge to Israel for a prolonged period of time
despite the "surprise" attack. Yet the case of the "Six Day War"
at least demonstrates a situation when the first use of armed force
in self-defense could withstand The Caroline test. For a variety of
reasons, including the failure of international society to contribute
to the solution of the Middle Eastern problem prior to 1967 and
including the inability or unwillingness of the superpowers to make
any serious effort to control the behavior of the principal actors prior
to the outbreak of hostilities, it was also an exceptional case.
It is, then, this author's position that the cause of international
law would be much better served through the concentration on substantive requirements of and limitation to the right of use of force
in self-defense in case of an armed attack or threat of an armed
attack against the territorial sovereignty or political independence
of a state, rather than on the question of whether the first use of
force against the threat of armed attack is permissible under article
51 of the Charter. The attention, as this author attempted to show
above, is largely misdirected and the problem of interpretation cannot be solved by the doctrine for at least three reasons: (1) the
"sense" of self-preservation, (2) the failure of the collective security
system under the Charter, and (3) the inadequacy of the travaux
pr~paratoiresof the Charter. From the point of the normative analysis, article 51 of the Charter is one of those rules often found in all
legal systems. Its exact interpretation is impossible before it develops through case determinations by those authorized to interpret it.
That is not the fault of the rule but the natural consequence of
changing conditions and human ingenuity. What is of significance
is that the ultimate interpretation be not clearly contrary to the rule
and be able to coexist with rules to which the interpreted rule is
related.
C.

Collective Self-defense

Article 51 of the Charter, apart from its spartan formulations and
the silence of its principal secondary source of interpretation
(travaux prtparatoires),also presents a linguistic problem. Professor Hans Kelsen, in the best tradition of his "pure" (normativist)
jurisprudence wrote:
Article 51 confers the right to use force not only upon the attacked
state but also upon other states which unite with the attacked
state in order to assist it in its defense. This is probably the meaning of the term "collective self-defense." If so the term "collective
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self-defense" is not quite correct. It is certainly collective "defense" but not collective "self"-defense."
This textual inconsistency (and again, spartan formulation, if not
the lack of clarity of article 51), adherence to the concept of anticipatory self-defense in the wide sense of that term, traditional law,
and some pragmatic considerations have led to a variety of interpretations.
On the opposite side of the spectrum are two theories: under one,
principally Dr. Bowett's theory' each participant in the collective
action must have the individual right of self-defense; 9 under the
other theory an institutionalized alliance' is an independent subject
of the right of self-defense under article 51. 91 This second theory,
taken to its logical conclusion (and under the wide concept of anticipatory self-defense), could ultimately lead to the assertion that the
institutionalized alliance has a right of self-defense under article 51
of the Charter even if none of its member states had such a right
under particular circumstances. This is a plain non sequitur. Not
only can one refer to the language of article 51 ("against a Member
of the United Nations") or to chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter where
no such proposition can be found, but also if one can imagine the
situation where the alliance would be threatened without a corresponding threat to one of its member states, it would probably be
the case of a threat against its institutional existence or structure,
the unity of its members, etc. Such a theory in practice was painfully demonstrated in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia
(Warsaw Pact), Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic (Organization of American States), etc. However, the preceding should
not be taken as a suggestion that the members of the institutionalized alliance do not have the right to assist, pursuant to a treaty
provision, a member which has, in its own right, the right of selfdefense. They certainly do.
Dr. Bowett's theory has been rejected and is contrary to the practice of states as expressed in a variety of collective self-defense treaties. " For this author, the theory has, however, one appealing aspect.
'
"

supra note 77, at 792.
BOWETr, supra note 9, at 206. See generally id. ch. X. See also J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS
KELSEN,

OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

245 (1954).

The term "institutionalized alliance" is used here to describe the institutionalized grouping of states under article 51 of the Charter (e.g., NATO) or a regional organization with
"article 51 organization" characteristics (e.g., the Organization of American States).
"

& FELICIANO, supra note 72, at 244-53.
Moore, Legal Dimensions, supra note 74, at 55 n.73 (where other authors are also referred
to). For some examples of treaty formulations see note 100 infra.
McDOUGAL

"
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It has been mentioned already that Dr. Bowett is a proponent of the
wide concept of anticipatory self-defense. 3 Under his theory a state
can invoke its right of individual self-defense to protect "the substantive rights for which self-defense is a permissible means of protection;" 4 in other words the state can act in defense of any of these
rights anywhere and can use any means (including armed force) as
long as the action withstands The Caroline test. That state, having
in a particular case its own individual right of self-defense, can unite
with the other state which has the same right in the same case; i.e.,
both states can exercise their respective rights collectively. The attack against one state is the attack against the other state if there
are certain existing links between them-in fact a situation of interdependence, which can be either geographical, political, or economic, etc. 5 In that sense the theory opposes the system of alliances
dominated by major powers, which "assemble" a variety of states
within their respective "spheres of interest" and link them to themselves through the treaty system. Nevertheless, this aspect of Dr.
Bowett's theory lost its significance in the current world in which
the United States post-war alliances have crumbled or are crumbling.
In a world in which the collective security system under the
Charter has failed, in which there is no hope for an impartial determination of the existence of an interdependence, a threat to security, etc., and in which the governmental rhetoricians of both states,
involved and not involved, are often clearly contemptuous of facts
in controversial armed conflicts, Dr. Bowett's theory gives the widest latitude to more powerful nations. For example, if State B is
attacked by State A it should request the Security Council to act.
If the action is not forthcoming or if a decision is impossible because
of a veto, State B can request help from its defense treaty partner,
State C. Under Dr. Bowett's concept, State C would now have to
make a decision, which under the circumstances would have to be
a subjective decision, whether its security is threatened by A's attack against B. 6 That decision would determine whether C should
perform its treaty obligation. Assuming that B is a small state, it
can be seen readily that its security would be at the mercy of the
attacker and its mutual self-defense treaty partner. It seems to be
'

See note 77 supra and accompanying text.

'

See BOWET, supra note 9, pt. I (the quotation in text is the title of part I).
Bowett, Interrelation,supra note 29, at 48-50; BOWETT, supra note 9, at 237-38.

"

BoWETr, supra note 9, at 238.

"
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clear that the treaty between B and C would cease to be a deterrent
at any time when A could make an intelligent judgment that, for
instance, domestic political problems of C would induce C's government to determine that C's security is not threatened, in order to
avoid its treaty obligation.
Insofar as the treaty obligations are concerned, the decision of C
not to perform would have to be based, under Dr. Bowett's concept,
on one of the two possible arguments. First, since there has never
been a "sufficient link" between B and C, the treaty is void. 7 This
author believes that states which have nothing in common should
not enter into self-defense treaties. Nevertheless, if the treaty has
been in force, its invalidation by C only at the time it was invoked
by B would be a classical example of action in bad faith. The second
argument is that each collective self-defense treaty contains an implied condition along the lines of Dr. Bowett's argument." If one
takes into account the subjectivity of C's decision, it is imperative,
this author believes, that if the principle pacta sunt servanda has
any meaning, the collective self-defense treaty in the context here
discusse*d must be held presumptively valid and interpreted under
the usual rules of interpretation until the contrary decision of a
competent international organ. Taking into account that none of the
claims mentioned heretofore has been advanced (in the context discussed) by any party to a collective self-defense treaty since 1945,
and taking into account the doctrinal view of the majority of authors, it appears that the exercise of collective self-defense pursuant
to a treaty lies within the exception of article 51 of the Charter.
This interpretation of article 51 of the Charter leads, then, to two
conclusions: First, if each of several states has an individual right
of self-defense in the same case (States B and C were both attacked
by A) their defensive action, in the absence of a collective selfdefense treaty, is an exercise of the individual right of self-defense
even if, subsequent to the attack, they coordinate their actions (establish a joint command etc.). The right to act in concert in such a
situation has never been doubted and would have survived the law
of the Charter even if the term "collective" did not appear in article
51. A contrario, and this is the second conclusion, if the term "[or]
collective" has any independent meaning at all, it should be inter'7 In the context discussed (prohibition of the use of force) see, for example, article 53 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, open for signature May 23, 1969, UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL RECORDS 289, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.39/27 (1971).
" In the context discussed see article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.
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preted in view of the practice of states, the doctrine, etc., as embodying both the right of the attacked state to seek help pursuant
to the treaty and the right (which under a treaty is in fact an obligation) of a party to that treaty which does not have the individual
right of self-defense to assist the attacked state. The view that the
right to assist is created by a treaty (and recognized by article 51)
is indispensable if the action of the assisting state within the collective self-defense is to be distinguished from intervention.99 Since
such a right is an exception to the prohibition of article 2(4) of the
Charter, the treaty under which it arises should be interpreted restrictively. For example, the rights and obligations of the parties to
enter into mutual consultations in the event of an attack on one of
the parties"'0 do not create the right to assist within the meaning of
the collective self-defense. While the right to assist is created by a
treaty, the exercise of that right is wholly dependent on, and in its
scope identical to, the individual right of the attacked state. In that
sense the right of the assisting state is derivative or secondary.'0 '
That has important consequences. The right to exercise the right to
assist depends also on the request of the attacked state, which can
be made only by the legitimate government of the attacked state. 02
The right is terminated if the attacked state so requests or if the
attacked state ceases to exist. The assisting state, specifically, must
not take over the primary initiative in the action in a political sense
of that word. It should assist the ally as effectively as possible, under
the requirement of proportionality, to achieve the goal of the action,
which is the restoration of territorial integrity and political independence of the ally. Therefore, it must not pursue during the action, any political goals of its own or engage in any administrative
action within the territory of the ally, which is not indispensible for
the effective military effort. Finally, even on its own behalf the
assisting state must comply with the mandatory provision of article
'

Cf. Bowett, Interrelation,supra note 29, at 46.
See, e.g., Treaty between India and the Soviet Union on Peace, Friendship and Co-

operation, Aug. 9, 1971, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 904 (1971). For different types of

collective (or mutual) self-defense clauses see North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat.
2241 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (effective for United States Aug. 24, 1949);
Treaty with Japan on Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 1632,
T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 373 U.N.T.S. 186 (effective June 23, 1960); Treaty with the Republic of
Korea on Mutual Defense, Oct. 1, 1953, [19541 3 U.S.T. 2368, T.I.A.S. No. 3097, 238
U.N.T.S. 199 (effective Nov. 17, 1954).
Cf. Falk, Cambodian Operation, supra note 74, at 7, 13-14.
2 Itshould be remembered that a state has a right to defend itself, not an obligation to
defend itself.
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51 of the Charter and notify the Security Council "immediately"
and, hopefully, try to gain international recognition for the validity
of the claim that the collective action is in fact collective selfdefense action. 0 3
On the other hand a civil strife within the territory of the victim
of the attack does not ipso iure affect the right of a treaty partner
to assist the attacked state. 04 The issues are (1) whether there is an
armed attack (or a threat of the armed attack within the limits
outlined above) by a third state against the victim and (2) whether
the government which requested assistance pursuant to the treaty
is, under international law and in fact (within the limits of reason),
the legitimate government of the attacked state, i.e., the treaty
partner (or the legitimate successor to political treaties) of the assisting state.
There is a strong political argument in favor of collective selfdefense treaties in a world in which the collective security system
under the Charter has failed. The argument relates to certainty and
stability, exploitation of the balance of power, security of small
states, and the need to contain nuclear weapons. Basic stability in
international relations (within the concept of peaceful change) was
certainly one of the goals of the United Nations at San Francisco.
Cf Falk, Cambodian Operation, supra note 74, at 21.
Article 3, paragraphs f and g of the Definition of Aggression, supra note 16, is quite
significant in this connection. Article 3 reads:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and
in accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State, which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such
territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
""
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In the context of the current triangle of power-the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the Peoples' Republic of China-basic stability is indispensable not only because it is both the condition and the
desired result of detente, but also because that stability underlines
the balance of power, which is thought to be the primary deterrent
to nuclear holocaust. It is also clear that basic political stability is
a necessary condition of change in the economic order, etc. The
impulse to intervene (nowadays primarily that of the USSR) or to
support strongly an intervention by a de facto dependent ally may
become irresistible despite the basic policy considerations in favor
of the preservation of stability, if there is no realistic expectation of
a strong resistance, which would make intervention too costly or the
probable cause of a major escalation of the conflict. Irrespective of
what has been said above about the legality of armed intervention
or counterintervention, it is quite clear that the post-Vietnam and
post-"Watergate" United States is unlikely to intervene elsewhere
without the sense of legality based on a strong treaty commitment.
A credible treaty commitment is thus not only a deterrent to the
impulsive intervention but also represents an element of pressure on
national decision makers and policy planners in two respects. First,
if they have a reason to fear a strong response then they are likely
to look for alternatives other than the use of force to influence events
elsewhere. Second, if the national decision maker believes that he
has the right to intervene on behalf of a friendly government without
a treaty commitment, he may often be tempted to fabricate the
invitation and to intervene whenever he believes that the prestige
of his nation is threatened, that nonintervention would be inconsistent with the global policy of his predecessors in government, etc. As
the United States debacle in Vietnam demonstrated, at the beginning there may not be a clear understanding of the problem in which
the friendly government is involved, and the intervention may appear to be minimal, which may lead to a misunderstanding with
respect to what it is that the intervening state wants to achieve or
how it can be achieved. Such may result not only in a later intragovernmental controversy as to the nature of the initial "commitment,"'
but also in a decision (be it a good one or not) that the initial
intervention was unwarranted, which may result in the abandonment of the assisted state with the consequent moral and ethical
problems with reliance which the initial intervention induced. On
the other hand, the collective self-defense treaty is usually concluded at a time when the need for actual assistance does not appear
to be imminent; since it is one of the most important and formal
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treaties for any nation, it is usually preceded by a lengthy intragovernmental discussion on the interests and relationships involved,
which clarifies the goal and the scope of an action, if one should
become necessary.
The collective self-defense treaties have represented a guarantee
of security to small nations. They still do; however, a number of
small nations now have an alternative of developing their own nu0 The uncertainty
clear weapons.'1
caused by interventions, refusals
to intervene, and unilateral terminations of interventions already
has found expression in the cynical attitudes of representatives of
the small nations. The Prime Minister of Iran, Mr. Hoveida, recently said that "in the life of a nation, there is only one security-[military] power."'' 6 That is a highly undesirable development. This author believes that if the United States sought mutual
self-defense arrangements with nations whose security is linked to
the security of the United States and in whose fate and development
the United States seems to have a genuine interest, it would not
only remove the problem and the stigma of intervention, but it
would also remove the danger of an arms race within at least some
small nations. Hopefully the Soviet Union and China would be persuaded by the example.
It should be emphasized that this author is opposed to alliances
"glued" together primarily for the purpose of providing an institutional structure for great power domination' 7 with the purpose of
policing the internal development of the smaller member state, etc.
The misuse of such alliances in interventions by a dominant member in the internal affairs of other members under the pretext of the
threat of an attack by an outside power is notorious. There is no
need for an organizational structure of a collective self-defense arrangement if it serves just one purpose: collective self-defense in
" The trend has already started. One of the poorest nations, India, has nuclear technology;
there is a notorious assumption that Israel either has or is close to having nuclear weapons;
Libya is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons (as to Libya see N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1975, at 8,
col. 6).
I" Des Kaisers neue Waffen, DER STERN, March 6, 1975, at 50, col. 5 (translation by the
author).
"17 Without passing on the merits of the claim, it is quite indicative that even
such an
author as the former (Mexican) judge of the International Court of Justice wrote: "[With
respect to the 1954 O.A.S. meeting in Caracas] where the attitude of Washington was clearly
contrary to the idea of 'Pan-Americanism' . . . we believe that . . .[during that meeting]
the Secretary of State Dulles abandoned the good neighbor policy in order to pursue the
imperialist policy of the [United States]." FABELA, supra note 15, at 90 (translation by the
author).
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case of need. However, even if the dominant power had the best
intentions not to intervene within the alliance, an organization involving a stable power and a number of small nations at different
stages of development, with different interests and attitudes at a
particular time necessarily must be undergoing constant political
tensions, which are not conducive to a strong sense of commitment
to a treaty partner. 08 In order to make its commitment credible in
the international sense and the performance of the treaty possible
from the point of view of domestic politics and politicking, the
United States, this author believes, in the future should seek bilateral (mutual) self-defense treaties, which would be concluded for a
short time (3 to 5 years). At the end of such period the treaty should
be reviewable by the Congress rather than being automatically renewed in the absence of a notice or termination. Such review would
assure reaffirmation of the commitment; the short duration of the
treaty would make it possible to terminate the special relationship
between the two states without the political ramifications of denunciation in case of substantial changes of the political philosophy of
the ally. This is not a suggestion that the United States should seek
such treaties with all of its friends, especially nominal friends. That
would be clearly contrary to the purpose of credibility. After all, the
small nations which are fearful of Soviet interventions or interventions by a Soviet proxy need the protective umbrella of the United
States only in case of the threat of nuclear attack. But there has not
been a single real threat of nuclear attack since World War II. If the
small nations were to unite on a geographical and ideological basis
in their own collective self-defense arrangements they would be able
to resist those attacks which have often occurred: attacks with conventional weapons. 0 9 Such a system would be far more conducive
to desired stability of the international society than that provided
either by the good intentions of the United States or by the American promises which, nowadays, the United States is unable to keep.
III.

INTERVENTION OTHER THAN IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE

2(4)

OF THE

CHARTER

This author has never read in any international document of any
significance a sentence so patently idiotic as: "No state may use or
" NATO is obviously an exception but only because, and only insofar as, it represents a
homogeneous group of states. Greece, Turkey and contemporary Portugal exemplify the
problem.
10' Freymond, L'Europe d la recherche de la securit6, in 5 ANNALES D'TUDES
INTERNATIONALES 11, 14-15 (1974).
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encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it
advantages of any kind.""" That sentence appears, of course, in that
resolution with the long title-the "Friendly Relations" Resolution.
It would be interesting, with respect to intervention "in the internal
or external affairs of any other State,""' to scrutinize the behavior
of all existing states since World War II under the "Friendly Relations" Resolution, Resolution 2131(XX),"I and a score of other General Assembly resolutions having some bearing on the subject. The
inevitable formula that the rights and obligations under the Charter
are not affected," 3 and the redundant statement in the "Friendly
Relations" Resolution that the principles therein are "interrelated" "4 allow, of course, for appropriate justifications for interventions. A detailed treatment of this subject is not possible within the
confines of this article. However, due to the relationship of some
aspects of this problem to that explored in part I above, a few of this
author's conclusions should be mentioned by way of a summary.
It would appear that there is a sufficient justification to distinguish between (i) intervention in an existing civil strife and (ii)
intervention in the internal affairs of a state if there is no civil strife
involved.
(i) On the basis of the principle of self-determination, a case of
sorts could be made against any assistance"' to the legitimate government or to the challenger, even-to pay due respect to traditional international law-if the challenger reached the status of
belligerency. A very good case, on the strength of the principle of
sovereignty as well as on the basis of the mentioned resolutions,
could be made against any assistance to insurgents."' Yet those who

1"

"Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, at 123. The citation is from the second
paragraph of "The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state, in accordance with the Charter."
Resolution 2131, supra note 59, para. 1.
Note 59 supra.
11 See, e.g., id. para. 8; "Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, General Part, para.
2.
"Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, General Part, para. 2.
Be it supply of weapons, training of pilots, or supply of rice. It is very difficult nowadays
(and especially in case of a civil war) to conclude that some supplies do not contribute to the
military effort. The supply of sophisticated weapons to one side which could effectively wipe
out factions which not only do not have such weapons but do not have any means of defense
against them is a problem sui generis.
"I See, e.g., the second paragraph of "The principle concerning the duty not to intervene
in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter,"
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intervene steadfastly oppose, by their actions and in their words,"'
any limitations in the particular case in which they are involved.
Therefore, a blanket prohibition of intervention not only would be
totally unrealistic,"5' but also would detract from the strength of the
prohibition of armed intervention. The two types of intervention
should be distinguished for a variety of reasons, not the least of
which is the protection of the state whose government is sufficiently
stable to withstand an internal challenge, even if the challenger is
receiving foreign assistance (not armed assistance). In other words,
it is submitted, the law on this question is in flux and it will take
some time before any new rules will emerge.
It should be pointed out, however, that if the assistance to the
rebels reaches the stage of the use of force," 9 the victim has a right
to use force in self-defense, including collective self-defense. Also,
if the assistance to the rebels clearly includes the use of a proxy
which acts in violation of article 2(4), then the assisting state itself
acts in violation of article 2(4) of the Charter.
(ii) International cooperation in economic, humanitarian, and
other matters certainly has increased significantly since the Charter
was signed in San Francisco. 20 General international law' 2 imposes
certain obligations,'2 2 violations of which of course are prohibited.
"Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, at 123: "[N]o State shall organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards
the violent overthrow of the r6gime of another State or interfere in civil strife in another
State." This "rule," unlike some other "rules" in the "Friendly Relations" Resolution is
based on traditional international law.
"' In the current case-Angola-the general attitude of the USSR and Cuba exemplify the
problems. See, e.g., the excerpts from an article in Pravda, published after Secretary Kissinger's visit in Moscow and presumably reacting to the Angolan issue as raised by the Secretary
of State, in N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1976, at 1, col. 8; id. at 4, col. 4. It is also quite significant
that Cuba expressly stated that it would disregard a decision of the Organization of African
Unity if it called for termination of foreign intervention. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 12; 1976, at 1,
col. 6; id., Jan. 16, 1976, at 3, col. 4.
,, Cf. Farer, supra note 41, at 530. See also id. at 532.
"' Compare Definition of Aggression, supra note 16, art. 3, para. g with "Friendly Relations" Resolution, supra note 12, The principle that States shall refrain in their international
relationsfrom the threat or use of force against the territorialintegrity or politicalindependence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations, at 123.
I" A reader may find it interesting in this time of preoccupation of the United Nations with
economic and similar matters to read Professor Kelsen's remarks on the subject, contained
in his major commentary on the Charter and published in 1950. KELSEN, supra note 77, at
22-27.
I" General international law must be carefully distinguished from de lege ferenda views of
nations, for example those contained in the General Assembly resolutions cited note 61 supra.
'1 See, e.g., G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 89 et seq. (1971).
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The same applies to conventional law as between members, which
3
usually provides for specific remedies in case of violations.'
Whether the violation of such legal rules is also a violation of a
general duty of nonintervention is irrelevant, since the specific rules
apply as lex specialis.
The notion that contemporary states relinquished so much of
their sovereignty as to deprive themselves of the right to influence
events elsewhere by an action which is otherwise legal' 4 is baseless.
At any rate, such a transfer of sovereignty cannot be presumed on
the basis of the general duty not to intervene; it would have to be
proven specifically in each individual case. The concept of prohibition of intervention in this context can be maintained, perhaps, as
a "reincarnation" of the doctrine of abuse of rights'2 with all its
traditional limitations. If a state exercises its right, then, as
Professor Schwarzenberger points out, "the presumptions in favor
of good faith and law abidingness impose such a heavy burden of
proof on any claimant that this line of argument is but rarely advisable."'
IV.

FINAL REMARKS

Every lawyer interpreting a legal norm is aware of the fact that
the content of the norm evolves with the changing society. If he is a
part of the environment in which the norm operates, his interpretation reflects not only the new facts to which the norm must be
applied, but also societal preferences-philosophical, ideological,
and practical-as well as his own preferences as to the function of
the norm. In the narrow sense of the term the function of a norm is
to regulate conduct, provide remedies, and resolve disputes. In the
broad philosophical sense of that term, and as seen through the eyes
of one who interprets it, the function of the norm is either to slow
down or to stop development if it conflicts with the values with
which one who interprets the norm and the group to which he be23E.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6 (1947),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. (effective for United States Jan. 1, 1948).
"I It is important to realize that characterization of an action, say of an economic nature,
as intervention does not have any "magic" consequences. Even if the action is legal, but, for
example, is considered to be an unfriendly act, then the "victim" has a right to resort to
retortions. Even with such an action as the Arab oil embargo it is very difficult to make a
case for violation of international law. For differing views in that case see Paust & Blaustein,
supra note 10. See also Letter from Stephen Smith to the Editor, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 136 (1975);
Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under InternationalLaw, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 391 (1974).
' See, e.g., G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 84 (1971).
Id. at 88.
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longs identify, or to accelerate the development if it serves such
values. Irrespective of his philosophy, however, the lawyer-unlike
the philosopher-is quite limited in his endeavors to influence social
development by the current views of the totalitarian elite in power
or by the current compromises within the democratic society; he has
to pay his dues to the current tangible facts and recognize, to some
extent, that the old maxim ex factis jus oritur is always in the
background.
Following are this author's a priori conclusions which have influenced his approach to the problems discussed.
The system of "universal" collective security under the Charter
has failed.'27 It failed as an elitist approach under chapter VII of the
Charter and it failed as an attempt for a majority rule under the
1950 Uniting for Peace resolution,'28 at least from the point of view
of the tiny minority of democratic societies and of those peoples who
do not benefit from the current conception of self-determination.
The regional organization substitute has proved to be dangerous
and not particularly effective. The only viable concept, with respect
to international peace and security, has proved to be that of the
29
nation state and its sovereignty.
A majority of the new states are struggling for their identity and
national coherence and are going through development not too dissimilar from the development of European states prior to this century. The "natural" development of the new nations, in the political
and the economic sense, is both accelerated and distorted by the
new technology which they are unable to absorb, but which contributes to the penetration of foreign influences which sometimes complicate their development. The conflicts among them, as well as
civil wars within many of them, are unavoidable and are incidental
to their development. They should be left alone, as their domination
by one or the other industrial power has proved to be short lived;
even the well-intentioned intervention, if there is such a thing as
well-intentioned intervention, of industrial powers has exacerbated
the problems of the new nations rather than helped to solve them.
The Soviet policy-making process is like a self-propelled wheel
which cannot be stopped overnight. The idea that "enlightenment"
"
"

Friedmann, supra note 36, at 575.
Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc A/1775

(1950).
I" See an interesting speech of Senator Muskie delivered in Chicago and printed on Senator Stevenson's motion in the Congressional Record. Muskie, The Future American Foreign
Policy, 121 CONG. REC. 59357 (daily ed. June 3, 1975).
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(by a good example or otherwise) of the ruler will bring about a
quick abandonment of his imperial policy towards his own people
or towards other nations is as ridiculous now as it was in the time
of Catherine the Great. The Soviet Union is going to continue to try
to intervene-to extend its sphere of influence-by proxies or otherwise. D6tente may slow the wheel down but it will not stop it, at
least not now.' 30 It is indispensable for the success of detente not to
decrease the cost of intervention, not to upset the balance of power
too much. The United States should try to protect some nations-those which are stable enough to withstand internal pressures but too weak to withstand foreign intervention-on moral as
well as practical grounds. Both security and economic considerations demand such an approach; "fortress" America is nonsense.
The contemporary political climate in the United States makes
flexible and fast decisions by the executive impossible,'3 ' even if
they were to be made pursuant to the "best" subjective criteria to
be found and even if they were sanctioned by the often proposed
international lawyer within the National Security Council;' 3 hence
the preference for the self-defense treaties and hence the legalistic
approach to the problem.
' Cf. Pimont, supra note 1, at 778-79. Pimont refers to the Soviet practice (which he calls
"lapolitique des 'iots' ) of "implanting socialist enclaves within the capitalist sphere of
influence." Id. at 779 (translation by the author).
"I A respected journalist who certainly cannot be accused of "pro administration bias"
wrote in his "Foreign Affairs" column in the New York Times: "[As the result of Vietnam
and Watergatel the Presidency has been weakened to such a degree that the Chief Executive
cannot operate with the full authority allotted him by the Constitution." Sulzberger, When
Mud Gets in Your Eyes, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1976, at 33, col. 1.
,12
See, e.g., Ehrlich, The Legal Process in Foreign Affairs: Military Intervention-a Testing
Case, 27 STAN. L. REV. 637 (1975).

